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Experiencing insight when solving problems can improve memory formation for both
the problem and its solution. The underlying neural processes involved in this kind
of learning are, however, thus far insufficiently understood. Here, we conceptualized
insight as the sudden understanding of a novel relationship between known stimuli
that fits into existing knowledge and is accompanied by a positive emotional response.
Hence, insight is thought to comprise associative novelty, schema congruency, and
intrinsic reward, all of which are separately known to enhance memory performance.
We examined the neural correlates of learning from induced insight with functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) using our own version of the compound-remote-
associates-task (CRAT) in which each item consists of three clue words and a
solution word. (Pseudo-)Solution words were presented after a brief period of problem-
solving attempts to induce either sudden comprehension (CRA items) or continued
incomprehension (control items) at a specific time point. By comparing processing
of the solution words of CRA with control items, we found induced insight to elicit
activation of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex/medial prefrontal cortex (rACC/mPFC)
and left hippocampus. This pattern of results lends support to the role of schema
congruency (rACC/mPFC) and associative novelty (hippocampus) in the processing
of induced insight. We propose that (1) the mPFC not only responds to schema-
congruent information, but also to the detection of novel schemata, and (2) that
the hippocampus responds to a form of associative novelty that is not just a novel
constellation of familiar items, but rather comprises a novel meaningful relationship
between the items—which was the only difference between our insight and no insight
conditions. To investigate episodic long-term memory encoding, we compared CRA
items whose solution word was recognized 24 h after encoding to those with forgotten
solutions. We found activation in the left striatum and parts of the left amygdala, pointing
to a potential role of brain reward circuitry in the encoding of the solution words. We
propose that learning from induced insight mainly relies on the amygdala evaluating the
internal value (as an affective evaluation) of the suddenly comprehended information,
and striatum-dependent reward-based learning.
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INTRODUCTION
Insight has been an important subject of investigation in the field
of Cognitive Psychology for around a 100 years (Mayer, 1995). By
insight, we refer to the phenomenon that sometimes the solution
to a previously unsolvable problem is comprehended suddenly as
opposed to gradually, usually accompanied by a positive feeling,
while being convinced of the correctness of the solution. Several
studies suggest that insight can enhance long-term memory
(LTM) encoding (Auble et al., 1979; Dominowski and Buyer,
2000; Ash et al., 2012; Danek et al., 2013; Kizilirmak et al.,
2015). However, the neural mechanisms that mediate this link
between insight and successful encoding are largely unknown.
Previous studies suggest that the positive emotional response to
insight may play an important role, because successful encoding
of an insight solution is associated with higher activation of the
amygdala (Ludmer et al., 2011). The hippocampus is critically
important for the neural manifestation of explicit memory, and
its role in memory includes the detection and encoding of
novel stimuli, contexts, and associations (Ranganath and Rainer,
2003). Notably, the hippocampus has also been shown to be
involved in the processing of insights (Luo and Niki, 2003),
which may provide a further explanation for the facilitated LTM
encoding of insight-related information. The aim of the current
study is to identify neural correlates of successful encoding
of insight solutions, that is, suddenly comprehended presented
solutions, via functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
to stimulate further research by proposing a theory of a neural
network involved in learning from induced insight.
When investigating insight, it is important to be aware of the
fact that the operationalization of “insight” varies considerably
between studies. These variations can be boiled down to two
main operationalizations: a relatively objective one, in which
the experimenter classifies given problems as either insight or
no-insight problems in advance (Auble et al., 1979; Metcalfe,
1986; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 1998; Wills et al., 2000), and
a subjective one, in which participants classify their solution
either as being conceived via insight or not after they solved
the problem (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b; Danek et al.,
2013, 2014; Kizilirmak et al., 2016). In the experimenter-based
approach, insight problems are designed to make it very difficult
to solve them gradually by incorporating problem features that
usually lead to initial solution attempts, which in turn lead to a
dead end, necessitating “thinking outside of the box” to break the
fixation on the dead end solution attempt (Öllinger et al., 2014).
For example, when one needs to find a common association for
words that are only remotely associated, such as “tennis, manners,
and cloth” (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003b), one may become
fixated on the close associations of the single words such as
tennis—ball, racket, player, match, and manners—to say thank-
you, holding the door open, gentlemen. Solving this task is very
difficult to problem solvers, because it is difficult to think of
more remote associations. However, this is necessary to solve the
problem (the solution is “table”: table tennis, table manners, and
table cloth). In the participant-based approach, insight is assessed
by asking participants whether they had an “aha!” experience
during the solution of the problem. The subjective “aha!”
experience is usually defined as the feeling that the solution was
comprehended suddenly, while feeling surprised and convinced
of the correctness of the solution. Moreover, once comprehended,
the solution appears to be very easy to understand. A few
studies suggest that the subjective “aha!” experience does not
depend on solving the problem, but that it can also be perceived
when confronted with the solution after having unsuccessfully
attempted to solve the problem (Bowden and Jung-Beeman,
2003a; Kizilirmak et al., 2015, 2016). It should be noted that
both approaches to investigate insight, the experimenter-based
classification of insight and no-insight problems, as well as the
participant-based classification of solutions accompanied by a
feeling of “aha!” (insight) and no “aha!” (no insight), are equally
important to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms
behind insight. Evidence exists that both cognitive and neural
processing differ considerably, when comparing insight and no
insight with either approach (Auble et al., 1979; Jung-Beeman
et al., 2004; Ludmer et al., 2011; Danek et al., 2014). Both
approaches have their own merits: While the number of “insight”
and “no-insight” items as well as in which trial and time
point “insight” occurs can be controlled in the experimenter-
based approach, only the participant-based approach provides
information as to whether the participant actually consciously
perceives a qualitative difference between insight (“aha!”) and
no insight (no “aha!”). We therefore intended to combine both
approaches for the current study.
Traditionally, the problems used to study insight are tasks with
only one trial, such as the 9-dot problem (Maier, 1930) or the
widely known problem with the candle, book of matches, and box
of thumbtacks (Duncker, 1945). Although such tasks are well-
suited for studying behavioral manifestations or the subjective
phenomenology of the insight experience, different tasks are
necessary to study the neural underpinnings of insight. Measures
of underlying neural activity require multiple measurements of
the same kind, that is, many insight problems with minimal
differences that all engage comparable cognitive processing
strategies. One such task is the CRAT, developed by Bowden and
Jung-Beeman (2003b), which is based on the Remote Associates
Task by Mednick (1962), originally developed to study creativity.
For each trial of this task, a triad of three words is presented
which seem completely unrelated at a first glance (e.g., “death,
drain, and stem”). Participants are required to find a fourth word
that allows (by using this word as a pre- or suffix) to create a
compound word with each of the three initially presented words
(here: brain, i.e., brain death, brain drain, and brain stem). The
CRAT is especially suited for fMRI studies, as a large number of
such triads and solutions can be generated, and the solution can
be presented to induce insight (i.e., sudden comprehension) at a
defined moment in time, after participants had the opportunity
to think about the solution for a short time. This also facilitates
fMRI data analysis as the variation between participants and trials
is relatively small.
For the current study, we used a modified German version
of the CRAT where not only solvable (true CRA), but also
unsolvable (control) items were presented. Solutions were
presented after a short while [4 s presentation of the riddle + 2–
8 s fMRI jitter (fixation cross)] to induce insight (sudden
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comprehension) or not (continued incomprehension) at a well-
defined time point. Unsolvable items were created by shuﬄing
the triad and solution words of a subset of originally solvable
items that was equal in solution rate (when given 30 s to
solve an item), probability of experiencing a subjective “aha!”
as defined above, and probability to be rated as plausible,
based on a prior normative study which assessed these features.
Which of four subsets of items was used to create unsolvable
items was counterbalanced across participants. This procedure
ensured that all differences between the solvable insight condition
and the unsolvable control condition could be attributed to
sudden comprehension vs. continued incomprehension and
not to item-related differences (e.g., word length, frequency,
or any other perceptual differences between items). To avoid
any misconceptions, we would like to point out that in the
current study, we investigated induced insight, that is sudden
comprehension following a state of incomprehension induced
by presenting the solution, as did Ludmer et al. (2011). This is
important to note, because many recent studies operationalized
insight as “generating the correct solution to a problem
accompanied by a feeling of ‘aha!”’ (e.g., Bowden and Jung-
Beeman, 2003b; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Danek et al., 2013).
To investigate the neural correlates of successful encoding into
LTM, learning trials are usually compared based on whether the
encoded items were later successfully remembered or not. Such
contrasts are often referred to as “difference due to memory”
or DM contrasts, for short (Paller et al., 1987). Importantly,
neural correlates of LTM formation are not only determined
by the encoding task, but also by the memory retrieval task
used to test for encoding success. Depending on how memory
is tested, the DM contrast can reflect the encoding of different
aspects of the encoded information. In the current study, we
used the modified CRAT described above as an encoding task.
Participants were not informed that their memory would later
be tested, thus, successful encoding was incidental (as opposed
to intentional; see Richardson-Klavehn, 2010). The information
in the focus of the encoding process during this task may be
subdivided into several aspects, namely the triad, the problem,
the association between the triad and the problem, as well as
episode-specific aspects such as how participants felt when they
suddenly comprehended a solution. Memory was tested 24 h
later by presenting solution words without their triads, which
were either old (i.e., presented during the learning phase) or
were new. The task was to decide whether a given solution word
had been presented during the encoding task (“old” or “new”).
Although recollecting the associated triad or any other contextual
information about the encoding episode would almost certainly
be helpful during the decision whether a solution was old or new,
it was not a necessary requirement for the task. Thus, contrasting
learning trials of later recognized and later forgotten solutions
should primarily reflect successful encoding of the solution. If
successful encoding of the solution were mainly independent
of whether the presented solution was comprehended suddenly
or not, one would expect no difference between the successful
encoding of a CRA or control item’s solution. However, if induced
insight, that is, sudden comprehension, facilitated encoding,
as we hypothesized, CRA solutions would be expected to be
associated with higher recognition memory, higher recollection
rates, and differences in neural correlates of successful encoding.
While a number of previous studies investigated the neural
correlates of insight, only very few studies have addressed
the relationship between the occurrence of an insight and
episodic memory at a neural level. Insight as compared
with no insight (with differing operationalizations) has been
associated with increased activations of the medial temporal
lobe (MTL) memory system (right hippocampus, and bilateral
amygdala/parahippocampal gyrus) as well as prefrontal brain
structures (bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, IFG, middle frontal
gyrus, MFG), of the salience network [right insula, right anterior
to dorsal cingulate cortex (ACC)], and a temporo-parietal
network including the precuneus, the bilateral angular gyrus
(ANG), the right superior temporal gyrus (STG), and the right
temporal pole (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Aziz-Zadeh et al.,
2009—also using the CRAT; Luo and Niki, 2003; Qiu et al.,
2010)1. Brain areas implicated in the processing of insight
solutions were the right anterior STG, which may reflect the
integration of information across distant semantic relations
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004), the hippocampus, which has been
linked to the formation of novel associations (Luo and Niki,
2003), and IFG and ACC, which have been associated with more
meta-cognitive processes controlling the search and evaluation of
(potential) solutions (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009). Sandkühler and
Bhattacharya (2008), who also used a version of the CRAT, further
suggest that the right temporal activation may reflect retrieval of
the novel solution.
Regarding episodic memory for presented insight solutions,
analyzed by comparing later recognized old solutions with later
forgotten old solutions, the amygdala has been proposed to
play an important role due to the positive emotional response
in response to sudden comprehension (Ludmer et al., 2011).
These researchers further reported the left medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), ACC, and precuneus from the same contrast
(Ludmer et al., 2011). The precuneus is a region which previously
has been associated with successful episodic memory retrieval
(Shallice et al., 1994; Miller and D’Esposito, 2012) as well as
effortful semantic integration (Hagoort et al., 2009; Shimamura,
2011; Seghier, 2013). This may reflect the phenomenon that
a solution that could better be semantically integrated was
more likely to be remembered later on. The mPFC has
recently been suggested to play an important role in the
detection and encoding of schema-consistent information, that
is, information which can be easily integrated into pre-existing
knowledge (Tse et al., 2011; van Kesteren et al., 2012). In
this context, insight could also be understood as the rapid
formation of a novel schema (Mayer, 1995). Thus, the sudden
formation of a novel schema may further support learning from
insight.
In short, here, we investigated induced insight and the
successful episodic encoding of insight solutions by using a
version of the CRAT. To this end, we compared behavioral and
1Studies contrasting an insight condition with a null-event baseline were not
included in this summary as such a contrast may include unspecific effects and
therefore not accurately reflect the differential activation of insight solutions
compared to no-insight solutions.
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fMRI responses to solvable (CRA = induced insight condition)
vs. unsolvable items (control condition) and further contrasted
later recognized with later forgotten solution words. We
hypothesized that induced insight would facilitate encoding via
(a) The positive feeling, which may function as an intrinsic
reward and thereby enhance encoding by activating the
mesolimbic reward system and
(b) Better semantic integration due to the formation of
novel schemata, facilitating the integration of the new
information into existing knowledge.
Accordingly, we further hypothesized that, at a neural level,
insight-based encoding would engage brain regions previously
associated with reward-based learning such as the ventral and
dorsal striatum (nucleus accumbens/caudate) (Ikemoto and
Panksepp, 1999; Haruno et al., 2004) as well as brain structures
previously implicated in schema-based memory formation, most
prominently the mPFC (Tse et al., 2011; van Kesteren et al.,
2012). We used an episodic recognition memory test, because
such tests have often been used to study the influence of reward-
related areas on hippocampus-dependent encoding (Wittmann
et al., 2005; Krebs et al., 2009a,b; Chowdhury et al., 2012). With
respect to the hippocampus we predicted that activations would
primarily relate to the detection of novel relationships (Davachi,
2006), rather than successful schema-consistent encoding, which
has previously been demonstrate to bypass the hippocampus (Tse
et al., 2007; van Kesteren et al., 2013).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-eight graduate and undergraduate students volunteered
to participate in our study. Two participants were excluded due
to illness or technical problems during scanning. The remaining
26 participants (15 male, 11 female) had an average age of
25 years (SD = 3.7, range = 18 to 32 years) and were German
native speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All
participants gave written informed consent to participate in
the study. At the end of the study, they received financial
compensation, and the purpose of the study was explained if
requested. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee
of the University of Magdeburg, Faculty of Medicine, and was
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Material
We used our own German version of the CRAT (Kizilirmak
et al., 2016), which is based on the version published by Bowden
and Jung-Beeman (2003b) and contains 180 items. Each item
consists of three clue words (triad) and a solution word that can
be used to form a compound word with each of the triad words
FIGURE 1 | Example trials of the encoding and test phases. (A) Exemplary trial of the encoding phase. Participants were asked to press a button depending on
whether they thought the solution was plausible while experiencing an “aha!,” plausible without experiencing an “aha!,” or implausible during the presentation of the
solution. (B) Exemplary trial of the test phase. Participants were asked to decide whether a presented solution was old or new. If an item was judged as old,
participants should further differentiate between know and remember, or, if not sure about the solution being old after all, guess.
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(Figure 1). The solution word could either be used as a prefix
or suffix to build a compound with the other words. Whether
the same compound rule (only prefix/suffix or mixed) could be
applied to all triad words varied; about half of the items were
mixed. All words (triad words and solutions) were nouns or color
words. Solution words were only presented in singular form.
Due to the German grammatical rules regarding the formation of
compound words, some solution words had to be slightly altered
(for example by appending an ‘s’) to combine them with the triad
words. Solution words were unique while some triad words could
appear in up to two different triads.
The resulting normative data were used to divide the 180
items into six pools of 30 CRA items that had approximately
equal means with regard to item difficulty, plausibility, and
‘aha’ ratings obtained in a previously conducted normative
behavioral study2. Two of these pools were used as solvable
CRA items and the other two pools as unsolvable control
items presented in the encoding phase and the memory
test. The remaining two lists were used to provide new
solutions for the memory test to provide information about
the false alarm rate (new solutions incorrectly categorized as
old). Assignment of pools to conditions was counterbalanced
across participants by means of a reduced Latin square, such
that each pool was used in the CRA, control, and new
conditions. This procedure, along with the careful matching
of item-pools, ensured that old and new items at test had
highly similar normative properties (e.g., a priori solution
probability).
Unsolvable items for the control condition were created
by taking all triad words and solution words of each pool
and shuﬄing them separately (i.e., triad words among triad
words and solution words among solution words), using
the random permutation algorithm from MATLAB 7.1 (The
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The resulting control items
were manually inspected for accidental plausibility, meaning
that words of an item were semantically associated or could
incidentally still be combined to create compound words. In
those cases, shuﬄing was repeated until the triad and solution
words could no longer be combined. This way, six matched pools
of 30 items were created, each composed of four words, in which
the triad words could not be combined in a meaningful way with
each other or the fourth “solution” word. When an item-pool
fell into the control condition according to the counterbalancing
scheme just described, the shuﬄed version of that item-pool was
used. Owing to the counterbalancing scheme and this shuﬄing
procedure, differences between the CRA and control condition
could only be due to differences in cognitive processing, and
not to differences in perceptual, semantic, or affective properties
between individual words, or differences in word frequency in the
language.
Four items from the CRA and control conditions each were
used in practice trials during the encoding phase. The remaining
items were assigned to the two functional MRI runs in equal
proportions (56 items per run, 28 items per condition per run).
2The normative data can be requested via e-mail from the corresponding author:
jasmin.kizilirmak@scienceforfun.org.
Design
The solvable CRA and unsolvable control conditions were
presented in event-related manner. For the analysis, the items
were further split into conditions according to the participants’
responses. During the encoding phase in the scanner, participants
were asked to decide whether a presented solution was plausible,
and, if so, whether they experienced a feeling of “aha!” or not,
or whether a solution was implausible, once it was presented.
During the test phase, participants were presented with new and
old solution words and asked to (1) decide whether the solution
word was old or new and, if old, (2) whether they remembered
something from the encoding context (be it remembering what
they thought when they saw the target word, remembering some
of the triad words associated with it, etc.), whether they knew
due to a feeling of familiarity that the item was old, or whether
they were actually not at all sure and simply guessed it was
old (Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; Yonelinas et al.,
2005). This was done to get information about the quality of the
participants’ memory.
Procedure
Encoding Phase
The encoding of the stimuli was performed while participants
underwent fMRI scanning at 3 Tesla. Before entering the
scanner, participants first ran through a training session with
four items from the control and CRA conditions each. This
was done to ensure that they understood their task correctly.
During scanning, they saw 56 CRA items and 56 control items
equally split into two runs. An exemplary trial is shown in
Figure 1A. Each trial began with a fixation cross which was
presented for a duration between 2 and 8 s (pseudo-exponential
distribution) which was followed by the triad, presented for
4 s. Participants were instructed to try to think of a solution
during that time. From the normative study we knew that
only 7% of the CRA items are usually (median solution rate)
solved under 6 s. After the triad, another fixation cross was
displayed for a variable delay of 2 to 8 s. Thus, with the median
duration of the fixation cross jitter following the triad being
4 s and the triad not being displayed during that time, we
approximated that probably less than 10% of all items could
be solved during that time. The fixation cross was followed
by the target word, which was presented for 6 s. Participants
were instructed to provide one of three responses during the
presentation of the solution: plausible with “aha!,” plausible
without “aha!,” and implausible. Plausible with “aha!” and
plausible without “aha!” were assigned to either the left or
right index finger on a response box (counterbalanced across
participants), while implausible required a bimanual response.
The definition of the “aha!” experience was an adaptation of
the definition provided by Topolinski and Reber (2010) and
highlighted that comprehension of the solution should be sudden
and unexpected, and that the solution appears to be crystal
clear, once it is understood. The description was adapted to
be applicable to all solutions, whether they were presented or
found by the participant. The “aha!” definition (rough English
translation of the German original, cf. Supplementary) read as
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follows: “You have most likely already had an ‘aha!’ experience
yourself. These are moments in which you surprisingly find the
solution for a previously incomprehensible problem. You are
often unsure how you came up with this solution, but you are
convinced of its truth. However, you cannot only experience
such an ‘aha!’ when coming up with a solution on your own,
but also when you are provided with the solution after you
have unsuccessfully thought about the problem on your own.
For example, a friend tells a joke which you do not get. He
then explains the missing piece of information, and suddenly
it all makes sense and you may even ask yourself why you
did not comprehend it immediately. In our experiment, the
‘aha!’ experiences may qualitatively diverge from your real-life
experiences. It is therefore important to know the following
characteristics of an ‘aha!’ experience to make a decision during
the task: (1) The solution to the verbal riddle is comprehended
suddenly and with surprise. (2) The solution, once understood,
is comprehended with ease and seems very clear. (3) You are
convinced of the correctness of the solution and do not need
to question it. (4) The sudden comprehension is often associated
with a positive feeling. Importantly, we are not referring to pride,
but to the positive feeling which is based on the dissolved tension
upon comprehension.
Test Phase
Retrieval took place outside of the scanner, approximately 24 h
(mean = 24.24 h, SD = 1.08 h, range: 22.75–27.67 h) after
encoding. During the test phase (see Figure 1B for an exemplary
trial), participants were presented with solution words from
the encoding phase randomly intermixed with new solution
words (solution words from CRA items not presented at
encoding). Solution words from the eight practice trials were
not presented. Presentation of a solution word was preceded
by a fixation cross displayed for 1000 ms. Solution words were
presented until a response was made. During the presentation
of each solution word, participants were to decide whether the
word was either “old” or “new” (left or right cursor buttons,
counterbalanced across participants). They were specifically
instructed that they should only choose “old” when they were
sure that the word was seen during the encoding phase the
day before in the scanner. This served to split items for the
fMRI analysis into later recognized and later not recognized
to investigate brain processes during successful encoding (DM
effect). When a participant rated a word as “old,” they were
further asked to decide whether they remembered it and could
recollect contextual information or if they only knew that the
word was old on the next screen (displayed until a response
was made). In case “old” was chosen although the participant
did not feel confident about the item being old, they should
respond with “guess” instead of “know” or “remember.” The
remember/know/guess differentiation is a standard procedure
to differentiate between familiarity (e.g., recognizing a person
as someone who you know, but not knowing who it is or
where you know him from) and recollection (e.g., remembering
that this is Paul who was sitting in the row in front of you
during your last lecture). Please see Gardiner and Richardson-
Klavehn (2000) or Yonelinas et al. (2005) for further information
and our Supplementary Material for a decision tree for the
remember/know/guess/new decision provided as part of the test
phase’s instruction sheet.
Image Acquisition
Scanning sessions were conducted with a 3 Tesla Siemens
Magnetom Prisma Syngo MR D13D at the University Hospital
of Magdeburg, Germany, with a 64 channel head coil. The MRI
session consisted of two anatomical and two functional runs. The
first image acquired was a non-distortion corrected T1-weighted
image with a resolution of 1.1×mm 1.1 mm× 7 mm that served
as a localizer to set orientation for the following anatomical scan
[MP-RAGE sequence, resolution of 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm,
field of view (FOV) = 256 mm3, 192 slices, time to repetition
(TR) = 2500 ms, time to echo (TE) = 2.82 ms, flip-angle = 7◦],
which was used for co-registration of the subsequently acquired
functional images. During the two functional MRI runs,
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal-sensitive T2∗-
weighted echo-planar images (EPIs) were acquired (voxel
size = 2 mm × 2 mm × 3 mm including 10% inter-slice gap;
FOV = 216 mm3; 34 axial slices aligned to the AC-PC line;
TR= 2000 ms, TE= 30 ms, flip angle= 90◦). EPIs covered most
parts of the brain except for the most dorsal parts of the parietal
lobe, sensory and motor cortices. Both functional runs contained
500 scans.
Image Analysis
Data pre-processing and analysis was done in FSL 5.0 FMRIB’s
Software Library3 (Smith et al., 2004). Anatomical data were
processed with FSL’s brain extraction tool (Smith, 2002), to
free cerebral tissue from skull. The functional images were first
motion-corrected with the aid of FSL-tool MCFLIRT (Motion
Correction FMRIB’s Linear Registration Tool; Jenkinson et al.,
2002), followed by slice-time-correction as integrated in FEAT
which uses (Hanning-windowed) Sinc interpolation to shift each
time-series by an appropriate fraction of the TR relative to the
middle of the TR period. EPIs were then smoothed with a full
width at half maximum Gaussian kernel of 6 mm. To remove low-
frequency signal drifts, a high-pass filter with a cut-off at 100 s
was applied to the data. Participants’ functional scans were co-
registered with their brain-extracted anatomical scans using FSL
FLIRT (FMRIB’s Linear Registration Tool; Jenkinson and Smith,
2001) and spatially transformed into the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) standard reference frame.
First level (single-subject) analyses were carried out with
multiple regression (parameter estimation via least squares
method). Statistical time series analysis was performed using
FILM (FMRIB’s Improved Linear Model; Woolrich et al., 2001)
implemented in FSL, which includes a local correction of
autocorrelations. Two different general linear models (GLMs)
were generated: One model contrasted CRA and control
conditions, and the other was used to contrast later recognized
with later forgotten CRA solutions. Because control solutions
yielded too few recognized items, recognized and not recognized
items could not be modeled separately, but were collapsed
3http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/
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for the control condition. As it could not be assumed that
participants would stop trying to solve the triads or think
about their solutions before stimulus-offset we used a stimulus-
convolved approach to compare CRA and control processing.
To this end, we included the presentation times of the triads
(4 s) and the (pseudo-)solutions (6 s) for both conditions as
predictors in our first GLM. Owing to the concern that conditions
with ambiguous responses, that is, “implausible” for CRA and
“plausible” for the control condition, may introduce additional
variance, we computed the GLM also with additional regressors
for the triad and target interval for those “unfitting” combinations
(hence called ambiguous trials). While there were too few
trials to model separate regressors for CRA + implausible and
control + plausible (zero trials in at least one of these conditions
in 16 subjects), the composite regressor would nevertheless
capture the variance explained by ambiguous trials. The results
of the GLM with and without the regressor modeling ambiguous
trials were nearly identical. We report the data of the first GLM
with the regressor for ambiguous trials included.
In the second GLM, the CRA condition was further split
into later recognized and later not recognized items. Because
the number of trials in each category was already rather low,
we did not model ambiguous items (here: CRA items judged
as implausible) in a separate regressor in this model. Just like
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004), who also investigated neural correlates
of insight with the CRAT, we modeled the presentation of the
solution, meaning the moment of deciding the response, as
response-locked starting 2 s before the response and ending 2 s
after it (4 s interval). In modeling this regressor, it was irrelevant
whether the 2 s after button press were already part of the
presentation of the fixation cross that followed the presentation
of the solution. The rationale behind this approach was to capture
the moment of comprehension vs. deciding that the solution is
not meaningful, especially as the BOLD response is slow. In both
GLMs, all regressors were convolved with a gamma model of
the hemodynamic response function, and temporal derivations
were added to the model. Functional analysis was done with
z-statistics, which had been corrected at cluster level according
to random field theory. Unless otherwise stated, z-threshold was
2.8 and cluster significance threshold was 0.05 (Worsley, 2001).
Due to a programming error, the CRA and control trials of the
second run were not presented in a randomized but block-wise
manner (first, all solvable CRA items were presented and then
all unsolvable control items). Hence, all data were analyzed for
both runs separately and not collapsed (28 trials per condition
per run). The data from the second run are reported in the
Supplementary, as a block-wise presentation of first the CRA
and then the control items may have led to different effects. All
data reported below are from the first run in which conditions
were presented in a randomized order, that is, in an event-
related design. Although the results from the first and second
runs were overall comparable with respect to the behavioral
data and also for the fMRI contrast between CRA and control
(seeNeural Correlates of Induced Insight vs. Control here and
Test Phase 24 h Later of the Supplementary Materials), the
results did differ for the DM contrast (see Neural Correlates of
Learning from Induced Insight here and Test Phase 24 h Later
FIGURE 2 | Proportion of responses for each experimental condition.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
of the Supplementary Materials). This suggests that the blocked
presentation had an influence on LTM encoding, at least on the
neural level.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
Encoding Phase
First, we analyzed the distribution of responses across solvable
CRA and unsolvable control items on a purely descriptive level
(see Figure 2 for an overview). A total of 0.75 (SD = 0.18) of
all CRA items were rated as “plausible” and accompanied by an
“aha!” experience, 0.19 (SD = 0.18) were rated as “plausible”
without being accompanied by an “aha!” experience. Only 0.05
(SD = 0.06) of all CRA items were rated as implausible, and
participants failed to respond before the start of the next trial
in less than 0.01 (SD = 0.01) of all CRAT trials. With respect to
control items, the majority of items were rated as “implausible”
with 0.88 (SD = 0.15), while 0.07 (SD = 0.12) were judged
as “plausible” with “aha!” and 0.05 (SD = 0.09) as “plausible”
without “aha!.” Again, in less than 0.01 (SD= 0.01) of all control
items, participants failed to respond.
The high proportion of “plausible” responses for CRA items
confirmed a successful induced insight manipulation (seeing an
item as “implausible” would preclude sudden comprehension,
hence insight), whereas the high proportion of implausible
responses for control items corroborates the control condition
as a successful no-insight (continued incomprehension)
manipulation. Because many response categories contained
only very few trials (e.g., no “aha!”| CRA, no response| CRA,
implausible| CRA, “aha!”control), we did not split trials
according to the participants’ responses for the analysis of the
behavioral nor the fMRI data.
For the analysis of response times (RT), median RTs were
calculated on an individual level and were then averaged across
participants for each condition. For the CRA condition, mean
RT was 3453 ms (SD = 695 ms) and for the control condition it
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was 4465 ms (SD = 1219 ms). A paired-samples t-test confirmed
the statistical difference of mean RTs [t(25) = 3.68, p = 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.7484].
Test Phase
We analyzed memory performance with respect to the CRA and
control conditions. For these analyses, the conditions were not
further split depending on the response categories (i.e., plausible
with “aha!” / plausible without “aha!” / implausible). All means
and standard deviations are reported in Table 1.
Compared to the control condition (M = 0.39, SD = 0.17),
participants correctly recognized more old solutions from the
CRA condition (M = 0.48, SD= 0.16). A paired t-test confirmed
this difference to be statistically significant [t(25) = 4.36,
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.955]. Moreover, significantly more
solutions were remembered from the CRA compared to the
control condition [t(25) = 4.74, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.061].
The CRA (M = 0.29, SD = 0.11) and control (M = 0.29,
SD = 0.13) conditions did no differ in regard to their rate of
“know” responses as supported by a repeated-measures t-test
[t(25) = −0.25, p = 0.823, Cohen’s d = −0.063]. In other
words, recognition memory only differs for our CRA and control
conditions due to a higher remember rate for CRA (see Figure 3).
This suggests that CRA solutions leave a more detailed memory
trace, enabling participants to recollect some information about
the encoding episode.
To ensure that these results did not depend on the few cases
in which participants responded to CRA items as “implausible”
(mean number of trials = 1.4, SD = 1.6) or control items as
“plausible” (M = 3.0, SD = 4.8), we ran these analyses again
without those trials. The pattern of the results was basically
the same. CRA (M = 0.47, SD = 0.16) and control conditions
(M = 0.34, SD = 0.15) differed significantly in regard to
recognition rates [t(25) = 5.83, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.335].
CRA and control significantly differed in regard to their rate
of “remember” responses [M = 0.19, SD = 0.15 vs. M = 0.09,
SD = 0.08; t(25) = 4.65, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.096], but not
in regard to their “know” response rates [M = 0.28, SD= 0.11 vs.
M = 0.25, SD= 0.11; t(25)= 1.30, p= 0.205, Cohen’s d= 0.348].
New items were correctly identified in 0.77 (SD = 0.17) of all
cases.
4Cohen’s d was always calculated via d4 =MD/SDD, Cohen’s d= d4/√(r).
TABLE 1 | Memory performance (proportion of responses) for Run 1
during the test phase 24 h after the encoding phase.
Insight (CRAT) No-insight (control)
Mean SD Mean SD
Hit 0.48 0.16 0.39 0.17
Remember 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.09
Know 0.29 0.11 0.29 0.13
Guess 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09
Miss 0.46 0.17 0.55 0.19
FIGURE 3 | Recognition memory performance (proportion of
responses) for CRA (induced insight) and control items. The data are
split for response category (remember, know, guess, miss). To provide an
overview, all responses considered hits, i.e., correctly recognizing items as
old, are represented in the “hit (remember and know responses)” bar.
Functional Imaging Data
Due to the low number of no “aha!” CRA trials reported as
proportions under the section “Encoding Phase” (in absolute
numbers of trials, we had <16 trials in 25 participants, and even
<10 trials in 20 participants), we could not model “aha!” and no
“aha!” separately for CRA items.
Neural Correlates of Induced Insight vs. Control
The comparison of brain activity during presentation of the
triad in the CRA and control conditions revealed no significant
differences (p > 0.05) in either direction, suggesting similar
search processes in both conditions. In other words, participants
did not notice whether an item was solvable or not during the
presentation of the problem, supporting the comparability of our
CRA and control conditions. During the presentation of solution
words, however, an increased activation (Z-threshold = 3.3,
p = 0.05) was observed for correct solution words compared to
pseudo-solution words (contrast CRA > control) in frontal as
well as mediotemporal and inferior parietal regions (Figure 4,
yellow–red activations). We found higher activation in prefrontal
cortical areas, including inferior frontal gyrus, mPFC, and ACC,
as well as in the left hippocampus, and in temporo-parietal
cortices, including bilateral middle temporal gyrus (MTG), ANG,
and supramarginal gyrus (SMG). All activation clusters are
summarized in Table 2.
Calculation of the reverse contrast control > CRA (Z-
threshold= 3.3, p= 0.05) revealed significant activations in brain
structures primarily implicated in sensory-motor structures,
such as the bilateral sensory-motor cortices (postcentral gyrus
and precentral gyrus), and supplementary motor area (SMA)
(Table 3; Figure 4 green–blue activations) which is probably
due to the high rate of bimanual “implausible” responses for the
control condition.
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FIGURE 4 | Functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) contrast for the CRA vs. control condition during the presentation of the solution. Unfitting
responses (i.e., “plausible” for control and “implausible” for CRA) were excluded. White–red activation clusters indicate CRA > control and green-blue activations
indicate CRA < control.
TABLE 2 | Activation clusters for the insight (solvable CRAT) > no-insight (control) contrast during the presentation of the solution.
Anatomical region Brodmann area (BA) Number of voxels p Z MNI coordinates (mm)
x y z
1 L middle frontal gyrus; 8, 9, 10, 32, 44, 46 13709 <0.001 6.56 −42 (−14) 18 (43) 52 (26)
L superior frontal gyrus;
L frontal pole;
L medial frontal gyrus;
anterior cingulate cortex;
2 L angular gyrus; 19, 39, 40 6096 <0.001 7.51 −46 (−51) −58 (−53) 46 (26)
L supramarginal gyrus, posterior;
L occipital cortex, superior;
3 R supramarginal gyrus, posterior; 7, 39, 40 4937 <0.001 6.74 52 (53) −44 (−50) 44 (29)
R angular gyrus;
R occipital cortex, superior
4 L posterior cingulate cortex; 23, 26, 29 4693 <0.001 5.52 −2 (−2) −32 (−51) 34 (35)
R precuneus
5 R cerebellum − 1841 <0.001 5.40 22 (32) −86 (−75) −34 (−32)
6 R frontal pole; 45, 46, 48 1293 <0.001 4.54 48 (51) 52 (38) 10 (5)
R inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis/pars opercularis
7 L cerebellum − 1219 <0.001 4.57 −54 (−36) −58 (−73) −30 (−33)
8 L hippocampus; − 334 <0.01 4.26 −28 (−25) −24 (−29) −10 (−6)
L parahippocampal gyrus
9 L middle temporal gyrus; 9 325 <0.01 4.37 −64 (−55) 2 (4) −28 (−28)
L temporal pole;
L inferior temporal gyrus
MNI coordinates are provided for the peak voxel as well as for the center of activation (in parentheses).
Neural Correlates of Learning from Induced Insight
Second, to investigate neural activation during successful episodic
encoding of presented CRA solutions (difference due to
memory effect, DM-effect), BOLD responses to later recognized
vs. later forgotten CRA solution words were compared (Z-
threshold = 2.3, p = 0.05). Because of a relatively low number
of remember trials in each run, we compared only hits and
misses without further differentiating between remember, know
and guess. The results are reported in Table 4.
Neural activation was observed in the left amygdala
(Figure 5B), left putamen and left caudate nucleus (Figure 5A),
bilaterally in the anterior and dorsomedial thalamus (Figure 4),
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and in the left inferior/middle frontal gyrus (Figure 5C). Further
activation clusters were observed in temporo-parietal regions,
namely within the posterior part of the left inferior temporal
gyrus (ITG), and in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), spanning the
right SMG and ANG (Figure 6). All activation clusters for the
DM-effect are summarized in Table 4.
DISCUSSION
The current study aimed to illuminate the neural correlates of
induced insight and successful explicit memory formation for
presented insight solutions by comparing solvable CRA (insight)
and unsolvable control problems, as well as by contrasting
encoding trials of later recognized and later not recognized
CRA solutions. We had hypothesized that induced insight, that
is, sudden comprehension of a previously incomprehensible
problem upon the presentation of the solution, would evoke a
positive feeling which may serve as an intrinsic reward, thereby
facilitating successful encoding. Though this positive emotional
response would probably be considerably weaker compared
to generating the solution themselves, most likely due to the
missing pride of solving the puzzle, evidence exists that it is still
often accompanied by a moderate positive response (Kizilirmak
et al., 2016). We had further hypothesized that CRA items
would be associated with better semantic integration due to the
formation of novel schemata, facilitating the integration of the
new information into existing knowledge.
Induced Insight Is Associated with Better
Learning of the Solution
Of all solvable CRA items (induced insight condition), almost
three quarters were rated to have elicited an “aha!” experience
TABLE 3 | Activation clusters for the insight (solvable CRAT) < no-insight (control) contrast during the presentation of the solution.
Anatomical region BA Number of voxels p Z MNI coordinates (mm)
x y z
1 L postcentral gyrus; 2, 3, 4, 6, 43, 48 1885 <0.001 5.24 −48 (−44) −30 (−20) 46 (48)
L supramarginal gyrus, anterior;
L precentral gyrus
2 R postcentral gyrus; 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 40 1239 <0.001 5.22 36 (38) −20 (−24) 50 (40)
R precentral gyrus
3 R supplementary motor cortex; 2, 4 437 <0.001 5.10 0 (−1) −2 (−8) 56 (54)
R precentral gyrus
4 R parietal operculum; 48 264 <0.001 4.88 42 (44) −24 (−23) 20 (20)
R central opercular cortex
5 L planum temporale; 41, 48 114 <0.05 4.55 −44 (−44) −34 (−34) 14 (15)
L parietal operculum
MNI coordinates are provided for the peak voxel as well as for the center of activation (in parentheses).
TABLE 4 | Activation clusters for the contrast between successfully encoded > not successfully encoded insight solutions.
Anatomical region BA Number of voxels p Z MNI coordinates
x y z
1 L fusiform gyrus; 19, 20, 21, 22, 37 1045 <0.001 3.62 −42(−28) −63 (−78) −12 (−16)
L middle temporal gyrus;
L inferior temporal gyrus
2 L medial frontal gyrus; 44, 45, 48 571 0.008 3.43 −45 (−48) 16 (26) 28 (24)
L inferior frontal gyrus (pars triangularis/pars opercularis);
3 L superior parietal lobe; 7 430 <0.001 3.43 −30 (−26) −57 (−54) 50 (52)
L lateral occipital cortex, superior region;
4 R superior parietal lobe; 7, 40 354 <0.001 3.36 34 (34) −55 (−54) 47 (50)
R angular gyrus;
R supramarginal gyrus, posterior region;
R lateraler occipital cortex, superior region
5 L caudate nucleus; − 247 0.01 3.3 −21 (−16) 5 (18) 0 (8)
L putamen;
L amygdala
6 Thalamus, medial dorsal and anterior parts; − 223 0.03 3.02 −5 (−8) −7 (−2) 11 (12)
MNI coordinates are provided for the peak voxel as well as for the center of activation (in parentheses). There were no differential activations in the opposite direction for
the chosen significance threshold.
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FIGURE 5 | Functional magnetic resonance imaging contrast for
successfully encoded (later recognized) > unsuccessfully encoded
(later forgotten) CRA solutions. (A) Axial view, z = 10, (a1) left caudate
nucleus, (a2) anterior thalamus, (a3) putamen, (a4) inferior temporal gyrus.
(B) Axial view, z = −12, (1) amygdala, (b2) inferior temporal gyrus. (C) Sagittal
view. (c1) inferior frontal gyrus, (c2) inferior/medial temporal gyrus.
(as described under the section “Encoding Phase”). This finding
supports the idea that, even when correct solutions are presented
rather than found by the participants themselves, a subjective
experience of “aha!” can be induced. On the other hand,
unsolvable control items were correctly identified as implausible
in almost 90% of all cases. Slightly more than 10% of those items
were rated as plausible (either with or without “aha!”), suggesting
that participants may, at some instances, have failed to press both
buttons for the implausible response simultaneously, as required,
or that participants might have occasionally found their own
creative individual associations between the triad words.
In line with the assumption that insight facilitates encoding
into LTM (Auble et al., 1979; Dominowski and Buyer, 2000;
Ash et al., 2012; Danek et al., 2013; Kizilirmak et al., 2015), we
observed higher recognition rates for CRA solutions compared
to the control condition’s “solutions” as well as higher recollection
rates for the CRA solution. The higher recollection rates indicate
that memories for CRA solutions were associated with a more
elaborate recollective experience, and were in this sense more
“episodic” (Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; Yonelinas
et al., 2005). In fact, the superior memory performance for
CRA items could be almost exclusively attributed to recollection
(Figure 3). This observation is similar to the commonly reported
preferential contribution of deep (i.e., semantic and/or elaborate)
study processing to recollection compared with familiarity
(Gardiner et al., 1996; Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn,
2000).
One limitation of the present study is that we did not
collect further information with respect to the content of
the contextual information recollected, for example, whether
participants recollected triad words associated with a solution
or what they felt when they saw the solution during encoding.
We suggest that the most likely information retrieved would
be the triad words associated with the solution, but we cannot
exclude that this particular information could also be retrieved
when participants correctly recognized the target word based
on familiarity. Therefore, we can only speculate that induced
insight was most likely associated with higher positive emotional
responses (Danek et al., 2013, 2014; Kizilirmak et al., 2015)
and better integration of the novel information into pre-
existing knowledge (van Kesteren et al., 2012). These potential
FIGURE 6 | Functional magnetic resonance imaging contrast for successfully encoded (later recognized) > unsuccessfully encoded (later forgotten)
CRA solutions.
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explanations are supported at a neural level by the higher
activation of the amygdala and striatum as well as the mPFC for
insight vs. no insight, as discussed below.
Neural Correlates of Induced Insight and
Insight-Related Memory Encoding
Regarding the neural correlates of induced insight vs. control
and successful (later recognition of old items) vs. unsuccessful
encoding (later misses), it is remarkable that differences were
only found for the presentation of the solution but not for the
presentation of the problem itself. This suggests (1) that our
control condition was not obviously unsolvable when presented
without the (pseudo-)solution, but well comparable to the actual
remote associations from the CRA condition which also seem
not associated at first glance, (2) that the CRA and control items
differed only in regard to sudden comprehension vs. continued
incomprehension when the solution was processed, and (3)
that the relevant encoding processes, which either led to later
recognition or non-recognition of the solution, occurred during
the processing of the solution.
The increased activations observed for CRA compared to
control items were largely consistent with previous findings. In
line with the idea that insight reflects the sudden comprehension
of a novel relationship between the solution word and the triad,
we found that insight was associated with a higher activation
of the left hippocampus. This activation is compatible with the
finding by Luo and Niki (2003). Luo and Niki (2003) interpreted
the observed hippocampal activation as reflecting reorienting
processes, implying both the breaking of mental fixations on
unsuccessful solution attempts as well as the formation of novel
associations (Luo and Niki, 2003). The present finding could
be explained analogously. Importantly, in the context of the
CRAT, neither the triad or solution words nor the compound
words per se were novel to the participants. Instead, the novelty
of the relationship between triad and solution words is a
purely associative one, as it is solely defined by the sudden
comprehension that the triad words have a common link in the
target word. Our data thus conform with our initial hypothesis
that the primary role of the hippocampus in insight processing
is the detection of novel associations. This is also in line
with earlier studies that have more generally implicated the
hippocampus in the detection of associative novelty, as defined
by a novel combination of familiar items (Düzel et al., 2003;
Schott et al., 2004; Davachi, 2006). Because novel combinations of
familiar items occurred in both, the solvable and the unsolvable
condition, our data extend these findings by further suggesting
that the hippocampus may be particularly sensitive to the novel
meaningful relationships between familiar items.
The induced insight condition differed from the control
condition also with respect to prefrontal cortical activations,
specifically in the mPFC, both rostral and dorsal ACC and IFG.
Similar to the interpretation by Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2009), the
ACC and IFG may have been involved in the evaluation of the
presented solution (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009). The dorsal ACC
would most likely act as a salience detector here (Seeley et al.,
2007), whereas the rostral ACC would rather be part of the
mPFC schema encoding network (van Kesteren et al., 2013).
More generally, particularly the left IFG has been implicated
in the semantic analysis of verbal information (Demb et al.,
1995; Poldrack et al., 1999; Schott et al., 2013; Soch et al.,
2016) and also in the retrieval of information from semantic (as
opposed to episodic) memory (Düzel et al., 1999). In the present
study, IFG activation might constitute a neural correlate of
retrieving semantic information regarding the compound words
from semantic memory (e.g., by checking with the pre-existing
English vocabulary whether “brain” and “death” can be combined
to a meaningful known compound word).
The mPFC on the other hand has not yet been implicated
in the context of insight as compared to no insight, although
it has been reported to be associated with successful encoding
of insight solutions (Ludmer et al., 2011). We suggest that the
stronger activation of this region for insight as compared to
no insight items most likely reflects the processing of schema-
congruency. Previous studies have demonstrated that the mPFC
is critically involved in the rapid encoding of novel information
into pre-existing schemata (van Kesteren et al., 2010, 2012).
In those studies, however, participants had acquired a schema
prior to the study, and mPFC involvement could therefore only
be demonstrated for encoding of novel, but schema-congruent
stimuli. Here, on the other hand, providing the solutions
to the triad words presented before most likely resulted in
the almost instantaneous formation of previously non-existing
schemata. We therefore suggest that, in addition to its, by
now well-established, role in the encoding of schema-congruent
information, the mPFC is also involved in the initial formation
of a schema—at least when this occurs at a rapid time scale. In
addition to schema congruency, mPFC activation in response to
CRA as compared to control solutions might, to some extent, be
associated with reflecting on pre-existing semantic associations,
which contributes more to deep as compared to shallow memory
encoding (Schott et al., 2013).
In contrast to studies by Jung-Beeman and Bowden (2000),
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) and Kounios et al. (2006), we did
not find activation in the anterior STG. In the aforementioned
studies, this region had been found when contrasting CRA
items that were solved and accompanied by a subjective
“aha!” “experience with CRA items solved without “aha!”
experience. Considering that we compared CRA items collapsed
across “aha!”/no “aha!” trials (due to the low number of no
“aha!” responses) with unsolvable CRA-like control items, this
difference is not surprising. It moreover suggests that there is
a neural processing difference between insight and no insight,
depending on whether this refers to sudden comprehension vs.
continued incomprehension or the subjective experience vs. non-
experience of an “aha!,” that is, the feeling that the solution is
comprehended suddenly, accompanied by a positive emotional
response, being convinced of the correctness of the solution, and
feeling that the solution is very clear and easily comprehensible
once understood.
The DM contrast revealed that brain regions involved in
successful LTM encoding of CRA items overlapped only partially
with those involved in the CRA condition per se. Specifically,
the only robust overlap between induced insight processing
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1693
fpsyg-07-01693 October 31, 2016 Time: 17:3 # 13
Kizilirmak et al. Learning from Induced Insight
and successful encoding of insight solutions was observed in
inferior parietal regions (ANG, SMG), which might be explicable
by attentional processes (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Cabeza
et al., 2012). Alternatively, or additionally, the temporo-parietal
junction (i.e., ANG and SMG) has also been implicated in level of
processing (LOP) during episodic encoding (Schott et al., 2013).
Strikingly, whereas in that study, we observed encoding-related
functional connectivity increase of the hippocampus with the left
IFG, the mPFC (see above) and the TPJ, only the hippocampal-
TPJ connectivity increase predicted the degree of the LOP effect
at the level of individual participants. Given this somewhat
comparable involvement of overlapping brain structures in deep
encoding and in the processing and encoding of CRA items, we
tentatively suggest that insight-related encoding might, to some
extent, reflect a special case of deep (i.e., semantic, associative)
encoding.
In line with our hypothesis that encoding of insight-associated
information might be related to positive feelings during sudden
comprehension, the DM contrast revealed increased activation
of the amygdala during successful encoding of presented
insight solutions, a finding in line with a previous study by
Ludmer et al. (2011). This supports their idea that emotional
arousal during processing of the solutions may contribute to
successful encoding. Furthermore, successful encoding of CRA
solutions was also associated with activations of the striatum,
particularly the caudate nucleus, extending into the ventral
striatum (Figure 3). The role of the ventral striatum in reward
processing is a well-replicated finding (Knutson et al., 2001;
Wittmann et al., 2005), and activation of more dorsal portions of
the caudate has been associated with short-term reward (Haruno
et al., 2004) and with reinforcement-based learning (Kahnt et al.,
2009). Given the previously reported improved explicit encoding
of reward-associated stimuli (Wittmann et al., 2005; Adcock et al.,
2006; Krebs et al., 2009a,b), a rather straight-forward explanation
for the striatal activation observed in the present study would be
the notion that learning from insight may in part be driven by
the processing of intrinsically rewarding information, which has
also been associated with recruitment of the mesolimbic reward
system (Daniel and Pollmann, 2010). Notably, participants did
not solve items on their own, but were presented with a
solution word (after an interval of generally unsuccessful solution
attempts) for which they needed to comprehend how it could be
combined with the triad words to build compound words. Thus,
even though the rewarding feeling of sudden comprehension was
probably lower than one might expect for generated solutions,
it seems to have been strong enough to elicit increased striatal
activation.
Somewhat surprisingly, neither the hippocampus, nor the
mPFC differentiated between successfully vs. unsuccessfully
encoded CRA solutions. Although one has to be careful with null
effects, one potential explanation for this finding could be the
way memory was tested. Memory for the solution was probed
via an old/new recognition test. Only the solution was presented,
and it was not necessary to retrieve any associated information
(e.g., the triad words), in order to decide whether a solution
word had been presented 24 h earlier. Such a decision could be
achieved solely on the basis of familiarity, although the behavioral
results clearly indicate that the recognition memory advantage
for CRA solutions could be largely attributed to recollection.
We tentatively suggest that the hippocampus might have already
been strongly engaged by the encoding of the novel meaningful
relationship, irrespective of later recognition (Figure 4), such
that subtle differences in hippocampal activation might not
have been picked up by the DM contrast. Given the recent
identification of the differential contribution of hippocampal
input and output structures to novelty detection and successful
LTM encoding (Maass et al., 2014), we propose that future
research should employ high-field fMRI to detect a potential
contribution of hippocampal output structures (i.e., pyramidal
CA1, deep entorhinal cortex) to successful encoding of insight-
associated information.
Limitations
One limitation of our study is that the number of trials per
condition in the DM analysis was rather low, and we were
therefore not able to further separately consider ambiguous trials
(i.e., CRA trials rated as implausible) in that analysis. It should be
noted, on the other hand, that the inclusion of a separate regressor
for ambiguous trials did not qualitatively affect the results of our
main statistical model (if at all, we observed somewhat larger
clusters when including the regressor; see Materials and Methods
section for details), and it thus appears that, in our view, it would
be unlikely that considering ambiguous trials separately in the
DM analysis would substantially affect the results.
Along the same line, it must be acknowledged that the number
of subsequently recalled items in the control condition was
too low to allow for a DM type analysis. We can therefore
not completely exclude the possibility that successful encoding
of the control items might engage a comparable network of
brain structures. Given the predominant engagement of the
hippocampal-prefrontal networks observed in more “classic” DM
studies and the previously demonstrated role of the striatum
in intrinsic reward (Daniel and Pollmann, 2010), along with
the unlikeliness of the control items to elicit intrinsic reward
responses, we nevertheless suggest that the involvement of the
mesolimbic network in successful encoding is at least to some
extent specific to the insight-inducing task used here.
Another limitation concerns the activation of the amygdala
and the striatum during insight processing successful encoding.
While activation of these brain regions has repeatedly been
linked to reward processing and/or emotional arousal, we
did not record an objective measure of arousal, such as
skin conductance or pupillary dilation in the present study.
Such a psychophysiological measure would be of particular
interest when comparing “aha!” and “non-aha!” items, and
future research should be aimed at differentiating objective
and subjective insight manipulations also at the level of
psychophysiology.
CONCLUSION
The findings of the current study suggest that encoding of
solutions to verbal riddles is more successful when the solution is
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comprehended suddenly (CRA = induced insight) as compared
to continued incomprehension (control). We further found that
induced insight was associated with higher activation of several
frontal, temporal, and parietal brain regions of which we would
like to point out the hippocampus and mPFC. The hippocampus
has been known to be involved in associative novelty, however,
never in the sense of detecting a novel meaningful combination
of known items (insight condition) as compared to just a novel
combination of known items (control condition). Thus, the
hippocampus may play a special role during insight processing,
by detecting novel meaningful relationships. The mPFC on
the other hand has been associated with detecting schema-
consistency and may be associated with the detection that a novel
meaningful relationship is consistent with existing knowledge.
Regarding the neural correlates of successful encoding of CRA
items, our current findings suggest that (1) the positive emotional
response toward sudden comprehension (insight) as reflected by
higher activation of the amygdala and (2) intrinsic reward as
reflected by higher activations of the striatum play key roles in
learning from insight. Our findings suggest that encoding insight-
related information is different from the encoding of non-insight
related information, because it seems to rely on reward learning,
which is not typical for information that is not associated with
external rewards. We would therefore propose that insight, that
is, sudden comprehension of a solution, may itself be rewarding,
thereby facilitating LTM encoding of insight-related information.
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